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Shanxi Province is a major province of coal, with coal-dominated state-owned enterprises taking the leading role and serving as the basic support and guarantee for the economic development of the province. At the same time, it also bears important functions and responsibilities such as business entities, profit entities, social stability, and security subjects. The provincial party committee and the provincial government accelerated the reform of coal and state-owned enterprises and solicited opinions from all parties to issue a series of policies and measures to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, including the Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Coal Management System and the Implementation Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Assets and State-Owned Enterprises. The Group and Jinneng Group, as province-owned state-owned enterprises, have tried to comprehensively deepen reforms, effectively breaking down institutional and institutional barriers, and striving to become bigger and stronger. Only by achieving new breakthroughs in the reform of state-owned enterprises can coal's big article be done well and be wonderful.

State-owned enterprises reform a risk

Although the state-owned enterprise reform in Shanxi Province has made some progress, there are still some problems.

First, in the ideological consciousness, it is prominently expressed as “two mixed”, that is, there is a simple mix of the national economic control and the control over the state-owned economy, and the control of the state-owned economy is mixed with that of the state-owned enterprises. The fuzzy understanding led to the state-owned enterprises achieving diversified equity in the second- and second-tier companies, but the parent company's property rights structure is single, the progress of the state-owned enterprises' shareholding system reform is slow, and the corporate legal person governance structure is difficult to establish and operate effectively.

Second, in the regulatory system, the outstanding performance is “two too many too detailed”, that is, the government departments have excessively detailed examination and approval matters, and the state-owned assets supervision agencies have excessively detailed management of state-owned enterprises’ specific issues, resulting in the state-owned enterprises failing to “get the governor”. It is not the "find the market," that is, the "find the market" initiative and energy are affected.

Third, the outstanding performance in the operational platform is "three shortages", namely:

First, there is no decision platform for effective checks and balances. The main issue is how the government departments implement pre-approval and supervision, as well as transitions after events. How the state-owned assets regulatory agency replaces the government’s customary approval method with the rights of the shareholders’ meeting and the board of directors. Management of the enterprise, lack of institutional and policy arrangements;

Second, there is a lack of specialized operating platforms. The main problems are insufficient integration of similar industries within the company, lack of specialized management agencies, mechanisms and levels, and inefficient operation of the enterprises; put at the provincial level to see similar industries, redundant construction, and insufficient talents This problem is even more prominent in competing with each other (such as coal chemical industry). Specialized division of labor and socialized cooperation are the basic trends of modern economic and social development. Professionals can do professional things to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness.

The third is the lack of multi-level, multi-channel capital operation platforms and excessive reliance on banks. The balance of the major groups exceeded RMB 100 billion, the asset-liability ratio exceeded 80%, and the annual financial expenses amounted to nearly RMB 10 billion, which became the bank’s “migrant workers”.

Fourth, the outstanding performance in fair competition is "two overweights."

At present, there is a tendency in the society to “demonize” state-owned enterprises. Qiuguan, Qifu, and Qiu Guoqi were not only popular among some ordinary people, but some so-called liberal scholars and reformists also overemphasized that private enterprises faced unfair competition such as glass doors, and attributed the achievements of state-owned enterprises to monopolies and governments. Subsidies obliterate the sacrifices and contributions made by state-owned enterprises in the fields of economic development, social stability and public goods.

State-owned enterprises bear a series of responsibilities of the business entity, the profit entity, the security entity, and the stable entity. They are overburdened with social stability, and the history is overburdened. As a result, state-owned enterprises cannot timely shut down inefficient and ineffective projects and cannot establish a truly marketable enterprise. Employing the mechanism to timely retires redundant personnel, because private enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises do not have the problem of “two overweights”, they have in fact formed unfair competition for state-owned enterprises.

Fifth, in the aspect of business management and control, it appears to be “virtual, scattered, weak and chaotic”.

The "virtual" performance is mainly characterized by large non-performing assets, high asset-liability ratio, poor debt repayment ability, profitability, and poor development ability;

"Sheng" mainly manifests itself in a large scope of business systems, with a large number of member companies (some as many as several hundred) and many management levels (fifth to sixth). After the reorganization of some state-owned enterprises, internal integration is only a physical change, even There is still a big gap between chemical evolution and deep integration.

"Weakness" is mainly reflected in weaker anti-risk ability, weaker overall profitability, and weaker core competitiveness compared with the leading state-owned coal companies in China. Under the current background of coal and electricity surpluses in China, the risk of weak corporate anti-risk ability is particularly high. prominent;

The "chaos" is mainly manifested in the fact that the company's internal management and control framework is not yet perfect, its operation is not smooth, and the institutional innovation is not enough. There are many problems in the management and control capabilities of subordinate enterprises. In particular, the market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises is not complete, and it still has a strong administrative color and a planned economy.

Sixth, internal corporate governance mechanisms are not smooth. Although the state-owned enterprises carried out the corporate system or even the joint-stock system reform, the corporate governance structure is not perfect, and there is a problem of "three unclear":

The first “unclear” is that the balance of authority and responsibility of the same level of corporate governance institutions is not clear. In particular, the boundaries between the authority and responsibility of the board of directors and managers, the chairman of the board and the general manager are unclear, and the board of directors, the general manager office, and the party committee office are merged into a party. The reason for the fact that the party committee, the board of directors, the board of supervisors, and the managerial level are all appointed by the organization department or the state-owned assets supervision agency, the power of the board of directors to hire managers is not really implemented;

The second “unclear” is that the parent company and subsidiaries, the parent company’s board of directors and subsidiary company’s board of directors have unclear boundaries of authority and responsibility, the parent company does not fully respect the subsidiary’s operational autonomy, the subsidiary’s management is too detailed, and the subsidiary’s board of directors delibrates. Adopted matters still need to be reviewed and approved by the parent company's functional department, or even reviewed by the parent company's board of directors;

The third “unclear” is that the parent company’s mechanism for effective supervision through its subsidiary corporate governance institutions has not been clarified. How to change the administrative management of subsidiary companies into property rights management, how to send property rights representatives, and how to ensure that property rights representatives are The subsidiary company's decision-making process not only reflects the parent company's intentions but also does not interfere with the subsidiary's business autonomy and other issues, and lacks clear ideas and mechanism guarantees.

Seventh, the safety risk of state-owned coal enterprises has increased. The main face of "six major risks" poses new challenges to safety management.